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1. Introduction
Nonpoint source pollution problems are characterized by the fact that it is either
impossible to observe the emissions or their observation is prohibitively expensive.
As a result, alternative instruments to a Pigouvian tax on the emissions such as
an ambient tax were proposed to correct this kind of externalities (Segerson 1988;
Cabe and Harriges 1992). However, the application of this tax in practice is highly
questioned (Horan and Shortle 2001) as there is, among other reasons, no direct
relationship between individual behavior and the amount of the ambient tax. Other
approaches utilize the amount of applied input as a proxy of the unobservable emis-
sions within the framework of a principal agent model (Shortle and Dunn 1986; Dosi
and Moretto 1993; Dosi and Moretto 1994). Yet, the amount of the purchased input
is a poor approximation of the real emissions (Shortle and Abler 1998). In order to
relate input use and emissions more precisely, it would be necessary to have complete
information about the amount of input applied at a particular location, the way the
input is applied, and to which activity it is applied. In order to elicit this information
we propose the application of a deposit refund system. In the previous literature,
it consists of a tax on the pollutant and the payment of a subsidy (refund) for the
correct elimination of the pollutant. In contrast to the previous literature (Sigman
1998; Kolstad 2000), where a pollutant was analyzed, we apply this approach to a
polluting input and a contaminating byproduct. Additionally we incorporate space
to take account of the spatial heterogeneity of the land. The consideration of space,
for instance in the form of a site vulnerability index, allows for the creation of a
more precise relationship between the input use and the resulting emissions that
reach the receptor, i.e. the place where environmental damage occurs.
Our proposal for the management of nonpoint source pollution is based on the
figure of an authorized firm that provides the service of a correct1 application of con-
taminating inputs with respect to its form and quantity. The authorized firm issues
a certificate to the firm that commissioned its services. The certificate issued by the
authorized firm allows observation of the correct application of the contaminating
inputs. The incorrect application, however, cannot be observed.
Given this context we derive first the socially optimal distribution of produc-
tion activities over space and their socially optimal intensity, i.e. the solution of
the regional planner’s decision problem. Due to the unobservability of the emis-
1Hereafter, we use the expressions “correct application” versus “incorrect application” to indi-
cate that inputs are applied with more versus less guarantees to avoid emissions, i.e., the correct
amount of inputs is applied and the inputs are applied such that emissions are minimal.
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sions that reach the final receptor or due to the presence of asymmetric information
with respect to the amount and the way of the application of the contaminating
input, a policy that replicates the first-best outcome is not available. Therefore,
a second-best policy based on a voluntary deposit refund system is proposed. The
parameterization of space, based on site vulnerability, allows for targeting the policy
site-specific, i.e., the deposit refund system is site-specifically differentiated.
Unfortunately, the introduction of spatially differentiated taxes gives rise to the
possibility of arbitrage and thus a black market may emerge. To avoid black markets
we propose ex ante uniform taxes and ex post spatially differentiated tax reductions,
for instance in conjunction with the income tax.
Once we have obtained the optimal distribution of production activities over
space and their socially optimal intensity we take account of the fact that many pol-
lutants accumulate over time. Therefore, we introduce time into our spatial model.
In order to obtain the socially optimal solution over space and time we employ
a further developed optimization procedure in two stages, initially introduced by
Goetz and Zilberman, 2000. This procedure enables an analysis of how the socially
optimal spatial distribution of production activities and their corresponding optimal
intensity develop over time. Given this knowledge we can design an intertemporally
and spatially optimal deposit refund system.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the concept of
space based on certain characteristics of the land. Based on this concept, in section
3 we present our spatial economic model and in section 4 we study the case of
asymmetric information where we propose a deposit refund system. In section 5 the
intertemporal aspects of the problem are introduced. The paper closes out in section
6 with some conclusions.
2. The concept of space
We suppose that in a given region Ω, some production activities causing pollution
take place. Region Ω reflects the origin of direct emissions of pollution and/or the
space where emissions convert into a pollutant that accumulates at a receptor located
in the region (for example, in the case of surface or underground water pollution, Ω
would represent underlying watershed). In order to have a more tractable model and
to concentrate on the proposal of a deposit refund system, we consider the case in
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which there is only one pollutant.2 Since the pollutant accumulates at the receptor
it will be necessary to consider time explicitly.
In our work we first concentrate on the spatial aspect in order to analyze the
repercussion of space in the determination of ambient policies.
We start from the idea that region Ω can be represented by a line that starts at
point 0, the urban center, and ends at point α, the limit of the region. Each location
is identified by α, α ∈ [0, α]. In order that variable α be sufficient to parameterize
region Ω, we employ several variables of interest such as geophysics, topography and
hydrology. In this way α can be interpreted as a georeferenciated index and not only
as a form of coordinates. Thus, our index is a function from Rn to R, where n is the
amount of variables of interest, and R is the real line. For example, α can represent
a land classification system that collects the relevant characteristics of each location
with respect to the pollution process at the receptor. Thus, space is not introduced
in the form of a standard parameterization but in the form of a parameterization of
the site vulnerability of each location within the considered region. Site vulnerability
captures the extent to which the application of a contaminating input leads to an
increase in the concentration of a contaminant at the receptor.
All the economic transactions in the region except production activities take
place at the urban center where extension collapses at a single point since it is small
relative to the total region. Production activities generate emissions of a single
pollutant that accumulates at a receptor that is located in the urban center (at
α = 0). The land outside the urban center is exclusively dedicated to production
activities. The emphasis in our model is on consumers that live in the urban center,
and are therefore affected by the pollutant at the receptor, versus the ones that live
outside the urban center. This is based on the hypothesis that there are many more
consumers living inside the urban center than outside.
Moreover, the different productive activities are part of a competitive system
where changes in regional production or changes in regional demand for inputs do
not affect the production or input prices of the competitive system. In other words,
they are exogenously given within our model.
To reduce the complexity of the analysis, we concentrate on the emissions that
reach the receptor (as in Hochman, Pines and Zilberman, 1977). That is, we consider
final emissions, accepting that part of the emissions in the origin are lost (absorbed,
decomposed or solidified) before they reach the receptor.
2The results with two or more pollutants would strongly depend on the existing interactions
between the different pollutants. Thus, we would obtain very specific results for each particular
case.
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Given this situation, we determine the optimal location of different production
activities in the region. For this end, we suppose that a regional planner maximizes
net actual benefits from the different agricultural activities, taking into account that
an environmental standard with respect to the emissions of the pollutant that reach
the receptor, should not be exceeded.
However, the optimal allocation of the production activities over space is only
the first stage of our optimization process over space and time. The regional plan-
ner’s maximal net benefit is then reflected by a value function that depends on the
optimal value of the decision variables and the exogenously defined parameters, for
instance, the environmental standard with respect to the emissions of the pollutant
that reach the receptor. Precisely this parameter becomes the decision variable in
the second stage. This procedure, described in more detail by Goetz and Zilberman
(2000) and Goetz and Zilberman (2002), allows the spatial and intertemporal opti-
mization processes to split into two consecutive stages, enabling the obtainment of
an analytical solution more easily.
3. The spatial economic model
According to the separation of the spatial and intertemporal optimization procedure
we start out with the first stage where we optimize over space. For the sake of
concreteness the production process is given by production activities with an infinite
number of agents, say farmers. Each farmer cultivates at a given location α, where
α is the parameterization of the region Ω, the total region for cultivation. Let L
denote the number of hectares of arable land in Ω. Since our parameterization of
space permits that not only a single point, but also a subarea of Ω corresponds to
a location α, the size of a given location α in relation to the size of the region Ω is
captured by the density function g(α) with
α∫
0
g(α)dα = 1. Thus, for each α, g(α)L
denotes the number of hectares of arable land at location α. The support of g is
the interval [0, α]. In the discrete case, g(α) denotes the proportion of Ω associated
with each α.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that only a single farmer cultivates at a
given location α and that there are two agricultural activities i, i = 1, 2 related to
crop production, for instance the cultivation of wheat and corn.3 The share of land
3Considering more than one farmer cultivating in α would complicate the analysis without
obtaining any additional insight for the problem posed. If m > 1 farmers cultivate in α, the
functions gs(α) defined for each farmer s = 1, ...,m satisfy
m∑
s=1
gs(α) = g(α).
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utilized for the cultivation of crop i at the location α is denoted by δi(α) ∈ [0, 1]
where
2∑
i=1
δi(α) ≤ 1. The production of each crop per hectare is given by the function
ϕ (xi(α) + yi(α), α; βi), where xi(α) and yi(α) are the only inputs considered; they
denote the amount per hectare of mineral fertilizer and the amount per hectare of
organic fertilizer applied at location α to crop i, i = 1, 2, respectively. We suppose
that ϕ presents constant returns to scale with respect to the size of the cultivated
area. The production function is site-specific and therefore crop yields vary with
location α. The parameter βi presents a productivity index specific for each crop i.
The fixed costs per hectare associated with the cultivation of crop i are denoted
by ki, i = 1, 2, which stand for the annualized capital investment costs. We assume
that the production function ϕ(·; βi) is differentiable in xi, yi and α. Applying the
chain rule we denote the derivative of ϕ with respect to either xi or yi by ϕ
′, which
is usually positive but very high amounts of fertilizer may lead to negative marginal
productivity. Moreover, ϕ is concave with respect to fertilizer, that is, ϕ′′ < 0.
The farmer at location α has also the possibility to keep livestock. The benefits
and costs of livestock at location α are denoted by h(y (α)) and z(y (α)), respectively,
where y (α) indicates the amount of manure per hectare of arable land at α (which
is equivalent to the stocking rate). Let us denote by h′(y (α)) and z′(y (α)) their
derivative with respect to y. A one to one relationship exists between manure and
the amount of animals. However, since we are interested in manure as a fertilizer as
well as a source of water pollution we have opted to express the amount of animals
in terms of manure. Farmers either use manure as organic fertilizer or if an excess
exists, they dump it. Let ye(α) denote the amount of manure in excess of organic
fertilizer per hectare of arable land at α. The per hectare manure balance condition
for the farm is given by:
ye(α) = y(α)−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)yi(α) for any α ∈ [0, α] .
Moreover, the use of fertilizer is not only productive but also leads to emis-
sions that are captured by two different emission functions. For mineral fertilizer
applied to crop i at location α the final emission function per hectare is given by
φ (xi(α), α; γ
x
i ) and reflects the final emissions due to the use of mineral fertilizer
that reaches the receptor located in the urban center. Organic fertilizer applied to
crop i at location α leads to the emission function φ (yi(α), α; γ
y
i ) and denotes the
magnitude of the emissions per hectare due to the use of organic fertilizer with site
quality characteristics α that reaches the receptor. We assume that φ (xi(α), α; γ
x
i )
and φ (yi(α), α; γ
y
i ) are differentiable in xi(α), α and in yi(α), α, respectively. We
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denote their partial derivatives with respect to xi and yi by φxi (xi(α), α; γ
x
i ) and
φyi (yi(α), α; γ
y
i ), respectively, which we assume positive. Parameters γ
x
i and γ
y
i ,
i = 1, 2 denote a pollution index which captures the relationships between the
amount of emissions and the amount per hectare of mineral or organic fertilizer ap-
plied in the production process, respectively. The dumping of excess manure leads to
the emission function per hectare φ
(
ye(α), α; γy
e)
, whose partial derivative with re-
spect to ye is denoted by φye
(
ye(α), α; γy
e)
and where for all i = 1, 2, φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)
>
φ (yi, α; γ
y
i ), for all y
e = yi.
For all α, let pi(α) and ωi(α) denote the output and mineral fertilizer prices,
respectively, that are faced by the farmer located at α. We suppose that for all
α > 0, pi(α) and ωi(α) differ from pi(0) and ωi(0) only by the transportation costs
that are taken care of by the farmer with p′i(α) < 0 and ω
′
i(α) ≥ 0.4 Thus, we rewrite
prices as pi(α) ≡ pi (ς(α)) and ωi(α) ≡ ωi (ς(α)) where ς(α) is a function that takes
only distance into account and no other variables of the land classification system.
We also consider the application costs of each type of fertilizer xi, yi, for each crop
i = 1, 2. They are defined by cxi (xi) and c
y
i (yi). We denote their derivatives with
respect to xi and yi by c
x′
i (xi) and c
y′
i (yi), respectively.
Let cy
e
(ye) denote the costs of dumping of excess manure and by cy
e′(ye) its
derivative with respect to ye. We suppose that cy
e
(ye) satisfies that for all i = 1, 2,
cy
e
(ye) < cy(yi) for any y
e = y1 = y2. For the sake of concreteness we assume that
the single pollutant is given by nitrate NO−3 .
Given this setup and taking into account an environmental standard that in-
troduces an upper limit on the concentration of the pollutant at the receptor, the
decision problem of the regional planner, say problem (R), consists in determining
the optimal values for xi(α) and yi(α), in selecting δi(α) the optimal activity itself
together with its scale, and in choosing the optimal scale of husbandry y(α) in order
to maximize the net benefits of the agricultural and livestock activities.
The solution of the decision problem of the regional planner allows for the design
of environmental policies that induce individuals to behave optimally from a regional
perspective by correcting the optimal intensity and the choice of the type and scale
of the activity. See the appendix for details of the solution of problem (R) and
possible environmental policies under the assumption of full information.
In contrast to the regulator, farmers do not take into account pollution at the
receptor. To correct for this negative production externality, market intervention is
required. Pigouvian taxes on emissions at the origin were considered insufficient to
4With respect to labor we assume that the labor requirements of the activities are predominantly
met by the members of farm households.
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correct the externality (see Henderson, 1977, Hochman and Ofek, 1979, and Tomasi
and Weise, 1994). Hochman and Ofek (1979) show that an adequate tax should
equal the aggregate of the spatially differentiated marginal damage at each location
α. Like Hochman and Ofek (1979), Goetz and Zilberman (2002) introduced a final
emissions function that relates the amount of a polluter at the urban center with
the farmer’s emissions at each location α.
In this way, the Pigouvian tax on the final emissions at the receptor is able to
determine the optimal allocation of the use of land and fertilizers. However, since
this tax is imposed on final emissions at the receptor it is constant through space, i.e.
it is not spatially differentiated. Yet, these policies are not implementable because
of the required information. As an alternative, input taxes (nitrogen tax) have been
proposed. However, as shown in the appendix and by Goetz and Zilberman (2002)
input taxes alone are not able to establish the social optimum. They need to be
complemented by land-use taxes that, depending on the curvature of the emission
function, are either positive (tax) or negative (subsidy), in order to achieve the
socially optimal outcome.
While the land-use can be observed easily by the regulator, the amount of input
applied to each crop cannot be observed easily. Thus, the presence of asymmet-
ric information impedes that input taxes are able to establish the socially optimal
outcome.
The literature has not yet developed a widely accepted solution to the problem
of the optimal regulation of nonpoint source pollution.5 All previous approaches
share the fact that they do not take into account the way the contaminating inputs
are applied. To a great extent it is not only the amount of input which is responsible
for emissions but also the way the input is applied.
In order to give farmers incentives to reveal information about the correct appli-
cation of the inputs with respect to the amount and the method of its application, we
propose a deposit refund system that is presented formally in the following section.
This approach is new to the literature of the optimal management of nonpoint source
pollution. Sigman (1998) and Kolstad (2000) previously applied this approach in the
literature to regulate a pollutant directly. In contrast, the analysis presented in this
paper applies this approach to regulate a contaminating input and a contaminating
byproduct with respect to the applied amount and the method of its application
taking the spatial heterogeneity of the land into account. The correct application
of the input has to be done by an authorized firm that certifies the amount of in-
5For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different existing approaches see
Shortle and Abler (1998).
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put applied, and the correct form of its application for a particular crop at a given
location. For example, certain farmers or special firms may have been approved by
the authorities to apply mineral and/or organic fertilizers. Moreover, the authorized
firm issues a document that certifies the correct application of the input with respect
to its form and quantity. In order to provide incentives to apply fertilizers correctly,
the regulator gives a subsidy to reward the correct application. Farmers are only
entitled to enjoy the subsidy if they present the certificate of the authorized firm to
the regulatory body. In this way, the regulator can observe the correct application
of the farm’s fertilizers. The subsidy corresponds to the net savings of the social
costs of correct versus incorrect application. The regulator can derive the remaining
part of fertilizers that has not been applied correctly by observing the total amount
of fertilizers purchased and the total amount of manure generated at location α.
To reflect the social costs of the incorrect application of the fertilizer, a tax needs
to be introduced. As the net savings of the social cost for the correct application
are reimbursed via the subsidy, this tax is imposed on all fertilizers independently
whether they have been applied correctly or incorrectly.6
4. Site-specific deposit refund system
In this section we depart from the spatial economic model previously discussed.
The amount per hectare of mineral fertilizer applied correctly by an authorized firm
to crop i at location α is denoted by xai (α). Similarly, the amount per hectare of
mineral fertilizer applied to crop i by the farm itself at location α is denoted by
xfi (α). Thus, xi(α) = x
a
i (α) + x
f
i (α) is the total amount per hectare of mineral
fertilizer applied at location α. The price per unit of mineral fertilizer at location α
is ωi(α). The price of the fertilizer is independent of whether the input is applied
correctly by an authorized firm or not.
For location α, the authorized firm charges caxi (x
a
i (α)) for the correct application
of xai (α).
7 Likewise, the application of xfi (α) by the farm leads to application costs
6Alternatively to a voluntary deposit refund system, one could think of an obligatory program
where farmers are obliged to contract the services of an authorized firm. However, this solution
would not be efficient since the externality caused even by the correct application is not internalized
in the farmers’ decision process.
7In order to concentrate on the proposal of a deposit refund system we assume that the net
benefits of the authorized firm are zero at each period and that the farm costs do not depend on
the demand by the farmers.
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of cfxi
(
xfi (α)
)
, with caxi (x
a
i ) > c
fx
i
(
xfi
)
for each crop i, i = 1, 2 for every xai = x
f
i .
Similarly, cayi (y
a
i (α)) and c
fy
i
(
yfi (α)
)
indicate the application costs of organic fertil-
izer for crop i at location α by an authorized firm or by the farm itself, respectively,
with cayi (y
a
i ) > c
fy
i
(
yfi
)
for each crop i, i = 1, 2 for every yai = y
f
i . All cost functions
are costs per hectare. For any k = a, f , we denote their derivatives with respect to xki
and yki by c
kx′
i (x
k
i ) and c
ky′
i (y
k
i ), respectively. Thus, the per hectare production func-
tion now reads as ϕ
(
xai (α) + x
f
i (α) + y
a
i (α) + y
f
i (α), α; βi
)
. As before, by the chain
rule we denote the derivative of ϕ with respect to either xai , x
f
i , y
a
i , or y
f
i by ϕ
′, which
is usually positive but very high amounts of fertilizer may lead to negative marginal
productivity. Moreover, ϕ is concave with respect to fertilizer, that is, ϕ′′ < 0. The
emission function can now be differentiated according to the type and form of the
application of the fertilizer. For mineral fertilizer applied to crop i at location α
by an authorized firm the final emission function is given by φ (xai (α), α; γ
ax
i ), and
by φ
(
xfi (α), α; γ
fx
i
)
if the mineral fertilizer is applied by the farm itself. Organic
fertilizer applied by an authorized firm to crop i at location α leads to the emission
function φ (yai (α), α; γ
ay
i ), and to φ
(
yfi (α), α; γ
fy
i
)
if the farm applies the organic
fertilizer itself. For any k = a, f , we denote their partial derivatives with respect to
xki , and y
k
i by φxki
(
xki (α), α; γ
kx
i
)
and φyki
(
yki (α), α; γ
ky
i
)
, respectively. These emis-
sion functions satisfy φxfi
(·), φxai (·) ≥ 0, and φ
(
xai , α; γ
ax
i
)
< φ
(
xfi , α; γ
fx
i
)
for any
xai = x
f
i , and φyfi
(·), φyai (·) ≥ 0, and φ
(
yai , α; γ
ay
i
)
< φ
(
yfi , α; γ
fy
i
)
for any yai = y
f
i .
In this new framework, the manure constraint per hectare is given by
y(α) = ye(α) +
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
(
yai (α) + y
f
i (α)
)
for any α ∈ [0, α] .
The spreading of ye(α), the amount of excess manure dumped per hectare of arable
land, leads to the emission function φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)
whose partial derivative with re-
spect to ye is denoted by φye
(
ye(α), α; γy
e)
and such that for all i = 1, 2, φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)
>
φ
(
yfi , α; γ
fy
i
)
for all ye = yf1 = y
f
2 . Let c
ye(ye(α)) denote the costs of spreading the
excess manure and by cy
e′(ye(α)) its derivative with respect to ye. We suppose that
for all i = 1, 2, cy
e
(ye) < cfyi (y
f
i ) for any y
e = yfi .
Given this setup and taking into account that the regulator has imposed an
environmental standard, the decision problem of the regional planner from now on
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referred to as (RA) is given by
max
{xki (α),yki (α),y(α),ye(α),δi(α)} i=1,2
k=a,f
α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
[
pi(α)ϕ
(
xai (α) + x
f
i (α) + y
a
i (α) + y
f
i (α), α; βi
)
−
−ki − ωi(α)(xai (α) + xfi (α))− caxi (xai (α))− cfxi
(
xfi (α)
)
− cayi (yai (α))−
cfyi
(
yfi (α)
)]}
g(α)Ldα+
α∫
0
{
h(y(α))− z(y(α))− cye(ye(α))} g(α)Ldα (RA)
subject to
z0 ≥
α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
[
φ (xai (α), α; γ
ax
i ) + φ
(
xfi (α), α; γ
fx
i
)
+ φ (yai (α), α; γ
ay
i ) +
+φ
(
yfi (α), α; γ
fy
i
)]
+ φ
(
ye(α), α; γy
e)}
g(α)Ldα, (PC-RA)
ye(α) ≡ y(α)−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
(
yai (α) + y
f
i (α)
)
for any α ∈ [0, α] , (MC-RA)
xai (α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, xfi (α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, yai (α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, yfi (α) · g(α)L ≥ 0,
δi(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2; y(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, ye(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, and(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
)
· g(α) ≥ 0 for any α ∈ [0, α] . (LULC-RA)
In order to solve this problem we substitute ye(α) by y(α)−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
(
yai (α) + y
f
i (α)
)
as defined in the manure constraint (MC-RA).8 We define the Lagrangian function
L1 where we introduce the multipliers µ, λ2, ξkxi , ξkyi , ξδi , ξy and χ for i = 1, 2 and
for k = a, f . The multiplier µ is associated with the pollution constraint (PC-RA),
while all other multipliers (ξkxi , ξ
ky
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y, λ2 and χ for i = 1, 2 and for k = a, f)
are related with lower and upper limit constraints (LULC-RA).
The argument α of the variables/functions xki , y
k
i , y, δi, pi, ωi, g and of the
Lagrange multipliers will be omitted in order to simplify notation. The Lagrangian
is therefore given by
8In what follows, for sake of simplicity, we will use the notation ye if no ambiguity arises.
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L1 =
α∫
0
2∑
i=1
δi
[
piϕ(x
a
i + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi) −
−ki − ωi(xai + xfi )− caxi (xai )− cfxi
(
xfi
)
− cayi (yai )− cfyi
(
yfi
)]
gLdα+
+
α∫
0
[
h(y)− z(y)− cye(ye)] gLdα+
+µ
z0 − α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi
[
φ (xai , α; γ
ax
i ) + φ
(
xfi , α; γ
fx
i
)
+ φ (yai , α; γ
ay
i ) +
+φ
(
yfi , α; γ
fy
i
)]
+ φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)}
gLdα
]
+
+
α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
[
ξaxi x
a
i + ξ
fx
i x
f
i + ξ
ay
i y
a
i + ξ
fy
i y
f
i + ξ
δ
i δi
]
+
+χ
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi
)
+ ξyy + λ2y
e
}
gLdα.
We assume both that there exists a unique solution of this problem and that
g(α) > 0 for all α. Then, the solution has to comply with the following conditions
at every location α, α ∈ [0, α]:
L1xki = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− ωi − ckx′i (xki )− µφxki
(
xki , α; γ
kx
i
))
+
+ ξkxi = 0, i = 1, 2 and k = a, f.
L1yki = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− cky′i (yki ) + cy
e′(ye)− µφyki
(
yki , α; γ
ky
i
)
+
+µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e)− λ2)+ ξkyi = 0, for any i = 1, 2 and k = a, f.
L1y = h′(y)− z′(y)− cy
e′(ye)− µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e)
+ ξy + λ2 = 0.
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L1δi = piϕ
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− ki − ωi
(
xai + x
f
i
)
− caxi − cfxi − cayi − cfyi +
+ cy
e′(ye)
(
yai + y
f
i
)
+ µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e) (
yai + y
f
i
)
−
− µ
(
φ (xai , α; γ
ax
i ) + φ
(
xfi , α; γ
fx
i
)
+ φ (yai , α; γ
ay
i ) + φ
(
yfi , α; γ
fy
i
))
−
−
(
yai + y
f
i
)
λ2 + ξ
δ
i − χ = 0, i = 1, 2.
µ ≥ 0, µ
z0 − α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi
[
φ (xai , α; γ
ax
i ) + φ
(
xfi , α; γ
fx
i
)
+ φ (yai , α; γ
ay
i ) +
+φ
(
yfi , α; γ
fy
i
)]
+ φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)}
gLdα
]
= 0.
In order to concentrate on the economic interpretations we assume that the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions related to the restriction (LULC-RA) are satisfied.9 Once
the optimal value of all decision variables are obtained, these values can be used to
obtain the optimal value of ye, ye∗ using the (MC-RA) condition.
We now analyze the implementation of a deposit refund system to give farmers
incentives to contract an authorized firm that applies the inputs correctly. The
following proposition defines a deposit refund system that establishes the optimal
social outcome.
Proposition 1 (Site-specific deposit refund system)
Given the existence of an authorized firm and provided that (1) the total amount of
mineral fertilizer and the total amount of organic fertilizer used by the farmer for
each activity i can be observed at each location α, (2) and that technology choices,
βi, γ
ax
i , γ
ay
i , γ
fx
i , γ
fy
i and γ
ye can also be observed at each location α and for each
activity i, then an optimal policy can be obtained by the deposit refund system defined
as follows:
(a1) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific tax over the total amount of mineral
fertilizer applied to activity i at location α, τmi (α), equal to
τmi (α) = µ
∗φxfi
(
xf∗i , α; γ
fx
i
)
, i = 1, 2, and
9We use an asterisk as a superindex of a decision variable or a multiplier to denote its optimal
values.
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(a2) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific tax over the total amount of organic
fertilizer applied to activity i at location α, τ oi (α), equal to
τ oi (α) = µ
∗φyfi
(
yf∗i , α; γ
fy
i
)
, i = 1, 2, and
(a3) a spatially differentiated tax on the excess manure, τ(α), given by
τ(α) = µ∗φye
(
ye∗, α; γy
e)
, and
(b1) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific subsidy over the amount of mineral
fertilizer correctly applied to activity i at location α, smi (α), equal to
smi (α) = τ
m
i (α)− µ∗φxai (x
a∗
i (α), α; γ
ax
i ) , i = 1, 2, together with
(b2) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific subsidy over the amount of organic
fertilizer correctly applied to activity i at location α, soi (α), equal to
soi (α) = τ
o
i (α)− µ∗φyai (y
a∗
i (α), α; γ
ay
i ) , i = 1, 2, and
(c1) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific land-use tax or subsidy σi(α) given
by
σi(α) = µ
∗
(
φ (ya∗i , α; γ
ay
i ) + φ
(
yf∗i , α; γ
fy
i
)
+ φ (xa∗i , α; γ
ax
i ) + φ
(
xf∗i , α; γ
fx
i
))
−
− τmi (α) ·
(
xa∗i (α) + x
f∗
i (α)
)
− τ oi (α) ·
(
ya∗i (α) + y
f∗
i (α)
)
+
+ smi (α) · xa∗i (α) + soi (α) · ya∗i (α) R 0, i = 1, 2.
For simplicity of notation, the argument α of the taxes and subsidies τmi , τ
o
i , τ ,
smi , s
o
i , σi, i = 1, 2 are suppressed unless it is required for an unambiguous notation.
Proof. These instruments are obtained straightforward by comparing the first
order conditions (f.o.c.) of the regional planner problem (RA) with the f.o.c. of the
farmers’ decision problems that is analyzed below where a deposit refund system
and land-use taxes are implemented.
Each farmer cultivating at location α will choose the optimal strategy solving his/her
private decision problem given by:10
max
{xki ,yki ,y,δi}i=1,2,k=a,f
gL
{
2∑
i=1
δi
[
piϕ(x
a
i + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi) −
10For sake of simplicity, we suppress the Lagrange multipliers ξkxi , ξ
ky
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y, λ2, and χ for
i = 1, 2 and k = a, f , as decision variables.
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−ki − ωi(xai + xfi )− caxi (xai )− cfxi
(
xfi
)
− cayi (yai )− cfyi
(
yfi
)
−
−τmi
(
xai + x
f
i
)
− τ oi
(
yai + y
f
i
)
+ smi x
a
i + s
o
iy
a
i − σi
]
+
[
h(y)− z(y)− cye(ye)− τye]+
+
2∑
i=1
[
ξaxi x
a
i + ξ
fx
i x
f
i + ξ
ay
i y
a
i + ξ
fy
i y
f
i + ξ
δ
i δi
]
+ ξyy + χ
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi
)
+ λ2y
e
}
,
where ye is replaced by y −
2∑
i=1
δi
(
yai + y
f
i
)
given equation (MC-RA). Being L the
Lagrangian of this maximization problem,
Lxai = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− ωi − cax′i (xai )− τmi + smi
)
+ξaxi = 0, i = 1, 2.
Lxfi = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− ωi − cfx′i (xfi )− τmi
)
+ ξfxi = 0, i = 1, 2.
Lyai = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− cay′i (yai ) + cy
e′(ye)− τ oi + soi + τ − λ2
)
+
+ ξayi = 0, i = 1, 2.
Lyfi = δi
(
piϕ
′
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− cfy′i (yfi ) + cy
e′(ye)− τ oi + τ − λ2
)
+
+ ξfyi = 0, i = 1, 2.
Ly = h′(y)− z′(y)− cye′(ye)− τ + ξy + λ2 = 0.
Lδi = piϕ
(
xai + x
f
i + y
a
i + y
f
i , α; βi
)
− ki − ωi
(
xai + x
f
i
)
− caxi − cfxi − cayi − cfyi +
+ cy
e′(ye)
(
yai + y
f
i
)
− τmi
(
xai + x
f
i
)
− τ oi
(
yai + y
f
i
)
+ smi x
a
i + s
o
iy
a
i − σi + ξδi − χ+
− λ2
(
yai + y
f
i
)
+ τ
(
yai + y
f
i
)
= 0, i = 1, 2.

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It is important to note that the sign of the land-use tax, σi, can be either positive
or negative. That is, it can be either a tax or a subsidy.
The implementation of the deposit refund system as defined in Proposition
1 requires that the regulator is able to observe for every farmer the amount of
each type of fertilizer applied to each crop. However, the regulator cannot dis-
tinguish to which crop the fertilizer has been applied. Therefore, the regulator
cannot tailor the environmental policy to each specific crop in terms of the tax.
The tax of an implementable deposit refund system can be site-specific but not
crop-specific. As a remedy we propose taxes τm(α) = µ∗
2∑
i=1
δiφxfi
(
xf∗i , α; γ
fx
i
)
and
τ o(α) = µ∗
2∑
i=1
δiφyfi
(
yf∗i , α; γ
fy
i
)
over the total amount of mineral fertilizer applied
at location α and over the total amount of organic fertilizer applied at location
α, respectively. That is, over
2∑
i=1
δi
(
xai + x
f
i
)
and
2∑
i=1
δi
(
yai + y
f
i
)
, respectively. In
other words, for each type of fertilizer, the fertilizer tax corresponds to the weighted
average of the marginal costs of the final emissions of the two activities. Like-
wise, one can not observe the amount of manure that is applied by the farmer
and the amount of excess manure. Therefore, it is proposed to define a single ma-
nure tax, τ(α), that does not distinguish between yfi (α) and y
e(α). It is given by
τ(α) = max{τ(α), τ o(α)} and it is applied over the amount of manure not applied
by the authorized firm at location α, that is, over
2∑
i=1
δiy
f
i + y
e. At the end of the
cultivating period the regulator can observe the total output. Thus, given the infor-
mation about xai , x
f
i , and y
a
i he can estimate y
f
i . With this information, the regulator
may reimburse part of the collected tax, i.e., [τ(α)− τ o(α)] yfi if τ(α) = τ(α) and
[τ(α)− τ(α)] ye if τ(α) = τ o(α).
Consequently, the land-use tax has to be adapted accordingly. Moreover, since
site-specific taxes may differ from one location to another, arbitrage may occur, i.e.,
there may exist black markets for mineral fertilizer where farmers with a high input
tax are potential buyers and farmers with a low input tax are potential sellers. To
avoid the problem of arbitrage we propose to fix a tax τm = maxα τ
m(α). Farmers
with input taxes below maxατ
m(α) are able to claim back the difference between
what they paid and what they should have paid in their tax declaration. Since the
tax declaration is in retrospective the regulator already knows the cultivated crop
and the obtained yield. Given this information the regulator can calculate what the
farmer should have paid on the mineral fertilizer tax. Therefore, the regulator can
verify within certain limits whether the claims of the farmer are justified or not.
Proposition 1 establishes the conditions to determine the optimal taxes and sub-
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sidies. However, before implementing this deposit refund system the regulator has
to verify that the implementation of this system is socially and privately desirable.
That is, the social and private net benefits are bigger with the deposit refund system
compared to a system where no authorized firm exists. In other words, two types
of inequality constraints have to be fulfilled (social implementation constraints and
private participation constraints).
5. The Optimal Land Allocation over Space and
Time
After having analyzed the optimal allocation of inputs and land over space and
proposed an environmental policy to achieve a second best social outcome we now
turn to the intertemporal optimization of the optimal spatial allocation.
The value function V from the first stage is now employed in the second stage
of the regional planner’s decision problem. The objective consists of the sum of the
value function V that depends on z and a function m(s) that captures the monetary
damages caused by the pollution at the receptor and s denotes the concentration of
the pollutant at the receptor. The left-hand side value of the constraint (PC-RA)
of the first stage problem, z, becomes the decision variable in the second stage. It
still denotes the emissions of the entire region that reach the receptor; however, it
now depends on t like s. The terminal value function is given by F (s(T )). Given
this context the regional planner’s decision problem reads as:
max
z(t)
∫ T
0
(
V (z(t))−m(s(t)
)
e−rt dt− e−rT F (s(T )),
subject to
s˙(t) = z(t)− ξs(t), s(0) = s0, z(t) ∈ Z, (RT)
where a dot over a variable denotes the operator d
dt
. The set Z presents the interval
[0, z¯], where the upper limit of the set corresponds to the possible highest emissions
that could reach the receptor. Argument t of all the dynamic variables is dropped to
simplify notations whenever possible, without introducing an ambiguous notation.
Hence, the current value Hamiltonian in the second stage H reads as H ≡ V (z) −
m(s)− ψ(z − ξs). Note, that a negative sign in front of the costate variable ψ has
been introduced to facilitate its interpretation. The necessary conditions11 for an
11See theorems 1 and 3 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987).
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interior solution 0 < z < z¯ of problem (RT ) are given by
Hz = Vz − ψ = 0 ⇒ µ(t) = ψ(t) (2)
ψ˙ = ψr +Hs = ψ(r + ξ)−m′(s(t)) (3)
s˙ = z − ξs , s(0) = s0, (4)
where we made use of the dynamic envelope theorem to obtain the result of equation
(2). This equation states that the marginal value of the final emissions of the entire
region should equal its shadow cost ψ which, in turn, is equal to the shadow cost of
the spatial allocation problem µ. Equation (3) explains the change in the shadow
cost of a delayed reduction of a marginal unit of the pollution stock from period t
to period t+ 1. It states that the change is equal to the extra interest and “decay”
forgone paid on the shadow cost minus the cost of extra pollution associated with
the delay. The transversality condition requires that
ψ(T ) = F ′(s(T )). (5)
It shows that the shadow cost at the terminal point of time has to equal the marginal
terminal value of the amount of pollutant at the receptor. Hence, the particular
solution of differential equation (3) yields
ψ(t) = F ′(s(T ))e(r+ξ)(t−T ) + e(r+ξ)t
∫ T
t
m′(s(τ))e−(r+ξ)τ dτ , (6)
which states that shadow costs at time t correspond to the sum of the discounted
marginal terminal value for the remaining time (T−t) and the “present value” of the
integral of the discounted marginal damage from time t to the end of the planning
horizon. For both terms of the sum the discount rate consists of the social discount
rate and the natural decay rate.
Knowing that the optimal values of µ(t) and ψ(t) are identical we are able to
write the dynamic version of the proposed deposit refund system, simply by replacing
µ by µ(t) in proposition 1.
6. Summary and conclusions
For nonpoint source pollution neither the quantity nor the polluter is known. Fur-
thermore the problem is exacerbated by the heterogeneity of the biophysical condi-
tions that determine the transport and transformation process of the pollutant from
its origin to the arrival at the receptor. As a solution to this problem this paper
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proposes to incorporate the dimension of space in order to target an environmen-
tal policy specific to the biophysical conditions at each location. In this way it is
possible to relate more closely the amount of the contaminating inputs and of the
contaminating byproduct with the emissions that reach the receptor.
However, the emissions that reach the receptor do not only depend on the amount
of the applied inputs and byproduct but also on the way these are applied. Given
the fact that the regulator can neither observe the quantity nor the way the inputs
and the byproduct are applied there exists the problem of moral hazard. As a so-
lution that is new to the literature of the management of nonpoint source pollution
management, we propose a spatially differentiated deposit refund system. The re-
sults show that farmers who commission the service of an authorized firm to apply
the contaminating input or the contaminating byproduct correctly should receive a
subsidy equivalent to the net savings of the social costs of correct versus incorrect
application. The social costs of the incorrect application of the input and the con-
taminating byproduct however, need to be imposed on the polluter in the form of a
tax reflecting these costs on the input and on the byproduct. As the net savings of
the social costs for the correct application are reimbursed via the subsidy, the tax
is imposed on the input and the byproduct in general independently whether they
are applied correctly or not.
While the subsidy is site and crop-specific, the implementable tax is only site-
specific. To overcome this shortcoming a weighted tax is proposed. The different
magnitude of the tax from one location to another may give rise to arbitrage, i.e.
black markets may emerge. In order to avoid the formation of black markets it is
proposed to impose the highest site-specific tax and allow for reimbursement via
the tax declaration if the optimal site-specific tax should be below the highest tax.
Likewise, the regulator can not observe whether the manure is used as a fertilizer by
the farmer or whether it is dumped. Therefore, it is also proposed to utilize a single
tax on manure not applied by the authorized firm. The information about the crop
yields allows the regulator to reimburse part of the collected taxes after harvest.
Apart from policy questions, the paper also demonstrates the utilization of a
two stage optimization technique that optimizes in the first stage the allocation of
inputs and land over space and in the second stage, determines how this optimal
spatial allocation changes over time. In this way the optimal spatial intertemporal
form of the deposit refund system can be derived.
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Appendix
The regional decision problem (R) can be stated as
max
{xi(α),yi(α),δi(α),ye(α),y(α)}i=1,2
α∫
0
2∑
i=1
δi(α) (pi(α)ϕ(xi(α) + yi(α), α; βi)−
−ki − ωi(α)xi(α)− cxi (xi)− cyi (yi)) g(α)Ldα+
+
α∫
0
[
h (y(α))− z (y(α))− cye(ye(α))] g(α)Ldα (R)
subject to
z0 ≥
α¯∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi(α) [φ (xi(α), α; γ
x
i ) + φ (yi(α), α; γ
y
i )] + φ
(
ye(α), α; γy
e)}
g(α)Ldα,
(PC)
ye(α) = y(α)−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)yi(α) for any α ∈ [0, α] , (MC)
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xi(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, yi(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, δi(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0, i = 1, 2; y(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0,
ye(α) · g(α)L ≥ 0,
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi(α)
)
· g(α)L ≥ 0 for any α ∈ [0, α] , (LULC)
where the maximal admissible concentration of the pollutant at the receptor, as
introduced in the pollution constraint (PC), is denoted by z0.
In order to solve this problem we substitute ye(α) by y(α) −
2∑
i=1
δi(α)yi(α) as
defined in the manure constraint (MC).12 We define the Lagrangian function L̂,
where we introduce the Lagrange multipliers µ, λ2, ξ
x
i , ξ
y
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y and χ for i = 1, 2.
The multiplier µ is associated with the pollution constraint (PC), and all other
multipliers (ξxi , ξ
y
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y, λ2 and χ for i = 1, 2) are associated with lower and upper
limit constraints (LULC).
The argument α of the variables/functions xi, yi, y, δi, pi, ωi, g and of all
Lagrange multipliers, will be omitted in order to simplify notation in the text below.
Given the restrictions imposed on the decision variables the Lagrangian can be stated
as
L̂ =
α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi [piϕ(xi + yi, α; βi)− ki − ωixi − cxi (xi)− cyi (yi)] +
+h(y)− z(y)− cye
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)}
gLdα+
+µ
z0 − α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi [φ (xi, α; γ
x
i ) + φ (yi, α; γ
y
i )] + φ
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi, α; γ
ye
)}
gLdα
+
+
α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
[
ξxi xi + ξ
y
i yi + ξ
δ
i δi
]
+ ξyy + χ
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi
)
+ λ2
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)}
gLdα.
We assume both that there exists a unique solution of problem (R) and that
g(α) > 0 for all α. Then, the solution has to comply with the following conditions
at every location α, α ∈ [0, α]:
L̂xi = δi
[
piϕ
′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ωi − cx′i (xi)− µφxi (xi, α; γxi )
]
+ ξxi = 0, i = 1, 2.
12In what follows, for sake of simplicity, note simply ye if no ambiguity may arise.
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L̂yi = δi
[
piϕ
′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− cy′i (yi) + cy
e′(ye)− µφyi (yi, α; γyi ) + µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e)−
−λ2] + ξyi = 0, i = 1, 2.
L̂y = h′(y)− z′(y)− cye′(ye)− µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e)
+ ξy + λ2 = 0.
L̂δi = piϕ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ki − ωixi − cxi (yi)− cyi (xi) + cy
e′(ye)yi − µφ (xi, α; γxi )−
− µφ (yi, α; γyi ) + µφye
(
ye, α; γy
e)
yi + ξ
δ
i − χ− λ2yi = 0, i = 1, 2.
µ ≥ 0, µ
z0 − α∫
0
{
2∑
i=1
δi [φ (xi, α; γ
x
i ) + φ (yi, α; γ
y
i )] + φ
(
ye, α; γy
e)}
gLdα
 = 0.
Additionally, we assume that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, as a result of restrictions
(LULC), hold.
The Lagrange multiplier µ is interpreted as the shadow price of the prespecified
level of pollutant at the receptor. Thus, µ is constant over α since it is not evaluated
at a specific location but over the whole interval of the domain. Like the rest of
the multipliers, x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗, and δ∗i , the optimal values of variables xi, yi, y, and δi,
i = 1, 2, depend on α.13
Spatial environmental policy
In the following proposition we specify policies that would assure the optimal allo-
cation of inputs and land.
Proposition. (Spatial policies)
1. Provided that the final emissions can be observed, the first-best solution can be
obtained by a Pigouvian tax τ p on final emissions. The Pigouvian tax is τ p = µ
∗.
2. Provided that the inputs and technology choices, βi, γi, and γ
ye, can be observed
at each location α and for each activity i, an optimal policy can be obtained by
(a) spatially differentiated and crop-specific input taxes τmi (α) and τ
o
i (α) on the
amount of used inputs xi and yi, respectively, equal to
τmi (α) = µ
∗φxi (x
∗
i , α; γ
x
i ) , i = 1, 2, α ∈ [0, α]
τ oi (α) = µ
∗φyi (y
∗
i , α; γ
y
i ) , i = 1, 2, α ∈ [0, α] together with
(b) a spatially differentiated tax τ(α) on the dumped excess manure ye given by
τ(α) = µ∗φye
(
ye∗, α; γy
e)
, α ∈ [0, α] , and with
13We use an asterisk as a superindex of a decision variable or a multiplier to denote its optimal
values.
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(c) a spatially differentiated and crop-specific land-use tax or subsidy σi(α) given
by
σi(α) = −τmi (α)x∗i−τ oi (α)y∗i+µ∗ [φ (x∗i , α; γxi ) + φ (y∗i , α; γyi )] R 0, i = 1, 2, α ∈ [0, α] .
To make notation simpler, we will omit the argument α of taxes and/or subsidies
τmi , τ
o
i , τ , and σi, i = 1, 2 unless necessary to avoid confusions.
Proof. Part 1 : It is straightforward when comparing the f.o.c. of problem (R)
of the regional planner with the f.o.c. of the farmers’ decision problems analyzed
below when introducing a Pigouvian tax.
Each farmer cultivating at location α will choose his optimal strategy solving the
following problem:14
max
{xi,yi,y,δi}i=1,2
gL
[
2∑
i=1
δi {piϕ(xi + yi, α; βi)− ki − ωixi − cxi (xi)− cyi (yi)}+
+h(y)− z(y)− cye
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)
−
−τP
(
2∑
i=1
δi [φ (xi, α; γ
x
i ) + φ (yi, α; γ
y
i )] + φ
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi, α; γ
ye
))
+
+
2∑
i=1
[
ξxi xi + ξ
y
i yi + ξ
δ
i δi
]
+ ξyy + χ
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi
)
+ λ2
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)]
.
Being L˜ the Lagrangian of this maximization problem, the first order conditions
are the following:
L˜xi = δi
(
piϕ
′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ωi − cx′i (xi)− τPφxi (xi, α; γxi )
)
+ ξxi = 0, i = 1, 2.
L˜yi = δi
(
piϕ
′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− cy′i (yi) + cy
e′(ye)− τPφyi (yi, α; γyi )+
+τPφye
(
ye, α; γy
e
i
)
− λ2
)
+ ξyi = 0, i = 1, 2.
14For sake of simplicity, we suppress the Lagrange multipliers ξxi , ξ
y
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y, λ2, and χ, for
i = 1, 2, as decision variables.
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L˜y = h′(y)− z′(y)− cye′(ye)− τPφye
(
ye, α; γy
e
i
)
+ ξy + λ2 = 0.
L˜δi = piϕ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ki − ωixi − cxi (xi)− cyi (yi) + cy
e′(ye)yi−
−τP
(
φ (xi, α; γ
x
i ) + φ (yi, α; γ
y
i )− φye
(
ye, α; γy
e
i
)
yi
)
+ξδi −χ−λ2yi = 0, i = 1, 2.
Part 2 : It is straightforward when comparing the f.o.c of problem (R) of the re-
gional planner with the f.o.c of the farmers’ decision problems analyzed below when
introducing input and land-use taxes or subsidies.
Each farmer cultivating at location α will choose the optimal strategy to solve the
following problem:15
max
{xi,yi,y,δi}i=1,2
gL
[
2∑
i=1
{δi [piϕ(xi + yi, α; βi)− ki − ωixi − cxi (xi)− cyi (yi)−
−τmi xi − τ oiyi − σi]}+ h(y)− z(y)− cy
e
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)
− τ
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)
+
+
2∑
i=1
[
ξxi xi + ξ
y
i yi + ξ
δ
i δi
]
+ ξyy + χ
(
1−
2∑
i=1
δi
)
+ λ2
(
y −
2∑
i=1
δiyi
)]
.
Being L˜ the Lagrangian of this maximization problem, the first order conditions
are:
L˜xi = δi (piϕ′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ωi − cx′i (xi)− τmi ) + ξxi = 0, i = 1, 2.
L˜yi = δi
(
piϕ
′ (xi + yi, α; βi)− cy′i (yi)− τ oi + cy
e′(ye) + τ − λ2
)
+ ξyi = 0, i = 1, 2.
L˜y = h′(y)− z′(y)− cye′(ye)− τ + ξy + λ2 = 0.
L˜δi = piϕ (xi + yi, α; βi)− ki−ωixi− cxi − cyi + cy
e′(ye)yi− τmi xi− τ oiyi−σi+ τyi+
+ ξδi − χ− λ2yi = 0, i = 1, 2.

15For sake of simplicity, we suppress the Lagrange multipliers ξxi , ξ
y
i , ξ
δ
i , ξ
y, λ2, and χ, for
i = 1, 2, as decision variables.
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The Pigouvian tax determines the optimal allocation of the use of land and
fertilizers. Since the tax is imposed on final emissions at the receptor it is con-
stant through space, not spatially differentiated. However, these policies are not
implementable because of the information required. For this reason, alternative in-
struments have to be considered. In part 2 of this proposition we concentrate on the
regulation of input use. However, inputs taxes are not enough to get the regional
optimum. The selected taxes have to go along with land-use taxes or subsidies that
determines the efficient allocation of land from the social viewpoint.
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